What We Talk About When We Talk About Hope:A Prototype Analysis by Luo, Siria Xiyueyao et al.
VU Research Portal
What We Talk About When We Talk About Hope




DOI (link to publisher)
10.1037/emo0000821
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Luo, S. X., Van Horen, F., Millet, K., & Zeelenberg, M. (2020). What We Talk About When We Talk About Hope:
A Prototype Analysis. Emotion. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000821
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 23. May. 2021
Emotion
What We Talk About When We Talk About Hope: A
Prototype Analysis
Siria Xiyueyao Luo, Femke van Horen, Kobe Millet, and Marcel Zeelenberg
Online First Publication, July 2, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/emo0000821
CITATION
Luo, S. X., van Horen, F., Millet, K., & Zeelenberg, M. (2020, July 2). What We Talk About When We
Talk About Hope: A Prototype Analysis. Emotion. Advance online publication.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/emo0000821
What We Talk About When We Talk About Hope: A Prototype Analysis




Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Tilburg University
Although hope is a well-studied topic, there is no consensus on its definition. Using a prototype analysis
(a bottom-up approach collecting laypeople’s views on hope), the present research defines hope and
provides insights into its associations with other related constructs. Study 1 identified a list of features
of hope derived from characteristics generated by laypeople in the Netherlands and the United States
when asked to think about hope. Study 2 determined the centrality of each of these features of hope,
where the most frequently mentioned features were classified as “central features,” whereas the less
frequently as “peripheral features.” Studies 3–5 then tested the validity of this classification and showed
that central features (compared with peripheral ones) were more often recalled and recognized (Study 3),
were classified as a feature of hope more quickly (Study 4), and were more representative in autobio-
graphical situations involving hope (Study 5). Our findings are in part consistent with the definitions of
hope reported in previous literature, and suggest in addition that some features deserve more attention
than before. Based on our findings and previous literature, we propose the following core elements of
hope: belief, positive, future, desire, and possibility. Accordingly, we propose the working definition that
hope is a belief that a positive future outcome is possible combined with a desire for that outcome. As
our research provides a more nuanced understanding of hope and its associations with other related
constructs, we hope the current findings will contribute to future research on this important topic.
Keywords: hope, faith, desire, prototype analysis, emotion
Hope is ubiquitous in people’s lives. People hope that the
weather will be sunny tomorrow, they hope to be admitted to the
school of their choice, they hope for recovery, even after a bad
prognosis, and now in early 2020, they hope the pandemic corona-
virus could vanish ASAP and no more people will die from it.
Hope is also ubiquitous in academic literature. We looked in Web
of Science (2020) from 1990 to 2020 for articles with the word
“hope” in the title and found 22,906 articles.1 To put this in
perspective, the frequency with which basic emotions such as
“happy” (7,173), “sad” (2,900), or “anger” (7,453) are used in
article titles, is much lower. Furthermore, the interest in hope is
broad, as it appears frequently in the titles of journal articles across
various different disciplines such as religion (1,408), medicine
(1,335), history (1,148), and multidisciplinary sciences (1,121, see
Figure 1). The prevalence of hope in daily life and academic
research clearly suggests that hope is an important concept. But
what are people talking about when they talk about hope?
What Is Hope?
In the Oxford English Dictionary (2019) (hereafter OED) hope
is defined as “an expectation of something desired” or “desire
combined with expectation.” This definition, however, does not
match perfectly with various early academic interpretations of
hope. Aquinas (1265/2006) and Hobbes (1651/1987) argued that,
beyond mere desire, the attainability of the desired “something” is
a necessary condition to activate hope; Spinoza (1667/1994) de-
fined hope as an emotion, and more specifically, a positive emo-
tion (i.e., “pleasure”); Hume (1738) and Spinoza (1667/1994) both
believed that hope roots in uncertainty, a characteristic that is not
mentioned in the dictionary definition at all. The definitions pro-
vided by these early philosophers not only differ from the OED
(2019) definition but also differ from each other.
In psychology, a similar variety in definitions and conceptual-
izations of hope can be found (cf. Bruininks & Malle, 2005). To
get a better idea about this variation, we summarized various
definitions of hope in Table 1. Specifically, we searched for
journal articles that contained hope in their title, keywords, or
abstract (using Web of Science, 2020) from a selected list of
1 Updated on May 31, 2020.
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1
psychology journals.2 Among the 104 publications that we found,
21 provide a specific definition of hope. We listed these 21
publications and the keywords used in their definitions in Table 1
in a chronological order.
Table 1 clearly illustrates that the definitions of hope vary from
article to article, indicating a low consensus of what hope is. The
table shows furthermore that when psychologists study hope they
focus on different characteristics and aspects of hope. For instance,
one primary discrepancy is that some researchers regard hope as a
cognition, while others regard it as an emotion; this difference
coincides with the discrepancy in other related aspects of hope
which will be discussed later in this paragraph. Specifically, Sny-
der, Cheavens, and Sympson (1997) treat hope as a cognition—“a
thinking process that involves an agency and pathways for one’s
goals” (p. 107)—and thus further define hope with keywords
including “goal-related” features such as “motivation,” “capabil-
ity,” and “determination.” However, other researchers regard hope
purely as an emotion (e.g., Bruininks & Malle, 2005; Hasan-Aslih,
Pliskin, van Zomeren, Halperin, & Saguy, 2019) and define it
using keywords such as “wish” and “desire.” Another discrepancy
deals with the relation between hope and “possibility.” Specifi-
cally, many researchers mention “possibility” in their definitions
of hope (e.g., Halevy, 2017; Kavussanu, Dewar, & Boardley,
2014; Nelissen, 2017; Whitson, Galinsky, & Kay, 2015), but
Snyder et al. (1991, 1996) do not do that.
Moreover, by summarizing the keywords of hope, we observe
opposing opinions on aspects suggested such as to whether hope is
generated by perceived control or a lack of control (Bruininks &
Malle, 2005). Specifically, given that some (e.g., Snyder et al., 1991)
argue that hope stems from one’s agency and pathway thinking, hope
is believed to appear only when individuals have control. At the same
time, others argue that hope stems from situational difficulties, where
hope is believed to become important when there is a lack of control
(e.g., Averill, Catlin, & Chon, 1990).
To sum up, despite extensive research on hope, it is still not
clear what we talk about when we talk about hope. The large
variety in how researchers define hope leads to different perspec-
tives on how to investigate the concept of hope. Therefore, we
2 We selected the following journals (in alphabetical order): Annual
Review of Psychology, Cognition and Emotion, Emotion, Journal of Ex-
perimental Social Psychology, Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, Motivation and Emotion, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
Personality and Social Psychology Review, Psychological Bulletin, Per-
spectives of Psychological Science, Psychological Review, Psychological
Science, Social Psychological and Personality Science.
Figure 1. The number of publications in Web of Science (2020) with the word “hope” in the title, in different









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4 LUO, VAN HOREN, MILLET, AND ZEELENBERG
believe that in order to identify the core elements of hope and to
distinguish hope from other concepts, a systematic understanding
of the importance of relevant constructs is needed. We conducted
a prototype analysis to cater to these demands.
Why Do We Need a Prototype Analysis?
When a clear definition of a construct is lacking, a prototype
analysis can be useful. Unlike dictionary definitions that often
provide boundary conditions to classify whether a construct satis-
fies all the “rules” to the defined concept, prototype analyses
generate a list of features that assemble some prototypical images
of the target concept. We use the example of a “chair” to illustrate
the benefits of prototypical analyses (cf. Seuntjens, Zeelenberg,
Breugelmans, & Van de Ven, 2015). The OED (2019) defines a
chair as “a seat for one person; now the common name for the
movable four-legged seat.” However, when searching for pictures
of “chair” online, one easily finds many chairs having three legs or
even no legs but a single base. What’s more, some chairs are
obviously for more than one person. As such, these real chairs
are not “chairs” according to the OED (2019) definition, but they
are considered chairs by most people. This illustrates that it is
difficult to define even a simple construct, such as a chair, not to
mention a complex and fuzzy one.
Prototype analyses enable people to define a construct that
cannot be simply distinguished by absolute boundary conditions,
by using a list of prototypical features. Particularly, when defining
some emotion-related constructs such as greed, love, gratitude, and
nostalgia, previous researchers have often successfully adopted a
prototype analysis (e.g., Elshout, Nelissen, & Van Beest, 2015;
Fehr, 1988; Fitness & Fletcher, 1993; Hepper, Ritchie, Sedikides,
& Wildschut, 2012; Lambert, Graham, & Fincham, 2009;
Seuntjens et al., 2015). In the present research, we follow this
tradition and apply a prototype analysis to understand the concept
of hope.
A prototype analysis is a bottom-up approach that collects
laypeople’s views of constructs by having them generate features
of hope, and then tests the importance of these features empiri-
cally. This method is complementary to top-down approaches that
base its conceptualization on small-sample interviews or research-
ers’ theorization. Top-down approaches can be helpful because
they immediately provide the essence of the research based on the
researchers’ critical thinking. However, they may sometimes be
subjective (e.g., due to its reliance on researchers’ interpretations
of small-sample interview results) and too specific to the research
at hand. Taking hope as an example, medical researchers might
have different ideas of what hope is from educational researchers,
because the concept of hope in medical domains is for instance
derived from interviews with severely ill patients (e.g., Cutcliffe &
Zinck, 2011), which might be quite different from interviews with
students (e.g., Scioli, Ricci, Nyugen, & Scioli, 2011).
The study of hope so far relies heavily on top-down approaches:
For example, of the 21 journal articles listed in Table 1, only one
article (i.e., Bruininks & Malle, 2005) adopted a bottom-up ap-
proach to define hope. In their Study 1, participants were asked
“How would you describe hope?” The answers were combined
with preexisting ideas from the authors’ and previous research
(Averill et al., 1990; Snyder et al., 1991), to create a list of hope
features. In the book Rules of Hope Averill, Catlin, and Chon
(1990) also used a bottom-up approach by asking lay people to
generate features of hope. These features were however derived by
asking participants to think about something they want or desire,
but not hope for, and about something they want and hope for.
Notwithstanding the importance of these findings, by implying that
desire and wanting are separate to the construct of hope, this
approach was not free from a preexisting theoretical perspective
and thus not fully bottom-up. Here, instead, a prototype analysis
was used, as it is a bottom-up technique free from any a priori
theories or opinions about hope, which can provide new insights
that are fully data driven.
Moreover, a prototype analysis is not only needed to overcome
the issues prevalent in top-down approaches, but such an analysis
is useful because it generates an extensive list of features of the
target concept. As such, it is expected to provide a more nuanced
understanding of the concept of hope and its function in people’s
daily life. Currently, researchers have reported the role of hope as
a coping mechanism of terminally ill patients (e.g., cancer; Herth,
1989), as motivation to reach ones’ healthy-eating goal (Winterich
& Haws, 2011), as motivation to search for more information (De
Mello, MacInnis, & Stewart, 2007), and as motivation to donate
(Kappes, Sharma, & Oettingen, 2013). The results of the current
prototype analysis may both confirm these functions and identify
more functions that hope can play in the life of people.
Finally, research has revealed a number of positive influences
that hope may have in many situations (e.g., Cavanaugh, Bet-
tman, & Luce, 2015; Winterich & Haws, 2011). Hence, it would
be advantageous if there was a way in which hope can be
induced in people. Unfortunately, at present there is a limited
understanding of how to operationalize hope, making it difficult
how to exactly induce it (Cohen-Chen & Van Zomeren, 2018).
Furthermore, a prototype analysis may also help in identifying
the antecedent conditions, which gives important insights to our
understanding on how to manipulate hope in research and how
to induce hope to help people to cope with uncertainties in
everyday life.
Overview of Studies
The current prototype analysis consists of five studies. In these
studies, we follow the procedures that have been used by many
other prototype studies (e.g., Gregg, Hart, Sedikides, & Ku-
mashiro, 2008; Hassebrauck, 1997; Hepper et al., 2012; Seuntjens
et al., 2015). In the remainder of this article we refer to these
articles when we mention the “standard procedure”. Study 1 is set
up to identify the prototypical features of hope. Participants were
asked to list characteristics they think to be important to describe
hope. These characteristics were then categorized by independent
coders, representing the features of hope. Study 2 examines the
centrality of the features (i.e., how closely each of the features
identified in Study 1 is related to hope) and categorizes them into
central or peripheral features. Studies 3 and 4 examine whether
central features are more accessible in memory than peripheral
features, by using a recall task (Study 3) and a classification task
(Study 4). Finally, Study 5 examines whether people rate central
features as more representative in their life events involving hope than
peripheral features, and whether hope features are rated as more
representative for hope events than for ordinary events, testing the







































































































the data sets are accessible on the Open Science Framework (https://
osf.io/hsrwg/?view_onlyaf0e0179bc394bf090dfecaa7f6fb1f1).
Study 1
The goal of Study 1 is to provide a list of features of hope using a
bottom-up approach. Participants were asked to list as many charac-
teristics of hope as they could think of (up to a maximum of 25).
Thereafter, the characteristics were grouped into higher-order catego-
ries, enabling us to construct a final list of features of hope. This study
was preregistered via AsPredicted (Dutch dataset: #18504, http://
aspredicted.org/blind.php?x3pd9ws; American dataset: #19114,
http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?xab7sw4).
Method
Participants. Our respondents were recruited from two sam-
ple populations: Dutch undergraduate students from a large Dutch
university and U.S. citizens from Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). One-hundred and 79 Dutch undergraduate students (127
males, Mage  19.12, SD  1.99; 100% Dutch native speakers)
participated in exchange for course credit. This sample size was
determined based on the largest sample size we had access to in
school lab at that time. In addition, we aimed to collect 180 usable
data points of U.S. citizens via MTurk and finally ended up with
202 participants3,4 (100% English native speakers; 197 Americans,
one Irish, one Porto Rican, one African American, one Israeli
American, and one Venezuelan) who took part in our study in
exchange for $0.60.
Although most prototype analyses used only one sample for
feature generation (e.g., Fehr, 1988; Seuntjens et al., 2015), we
decided to use a second participant pool (cf. Gregg et al., 2008).
We did so because the two samples have different cultures and
occupational backgrounds. Distilling laypeople’s ideas of hope
from both samples and selecting the overlapped part enables us to
(a) facilitate future extrapolations to multiple populations; and (b)
to “sieve” the nontypical categories of hope, namely, to eliminate
the unrepresentative exemplars of hope.
Materials and procedure. Participants read the below in-
structions in their own language, after which they were given 5
min to list as many characteristics (up to a maximum of 25) as they
could think of to describe hope:
This questionnaire is part of a larger project on the thoughts that we
have when we hear and use words. For example, if you were asked to
describe democracy, you might write: freedom, elections, equality. If
you were asked to describe a dominant person, you might write:
orders others about, take charge, always wants to be right. In your
view, which characteristics describe hope? Please write in the space
below all features that distinguish hope. In the next 5 min, list as many
features as you can think of. There are no right or wrong answers. You
are not required to complete all boxes. After 5 min have passed, you
will be able to continue to the final questions.
Results and Discussion
Following the standard procedure, we first coded the character-
istics into higher-order exemplars and finally grouped the exem-
plars into a list of features. Two native Dutch-speaking research
assistants classified the Dutch exemplars and two other coders
with a high proficiency level of English coded the English exem-
plars.
The Dutch participants listed 870 specific characteristics in total
(M  12.28, SD  5.49, per person), mostly single words. For
sentences/phrases that contained only one related meaning, we
treated them as single items; for sentences/phrases that contain
more than one related meaning, we followed the procedure of other
prototype studies (cf. Joffe & Yardley, 2004) and divided them
into “units of meanings”—each of which referring to only one
distinct characteristic of hope. Two Dutch coders followed the
four-stage procedure of Hepper, Ritchie, Sedikides, and Wildschut
(2012) to group the characteristics into higher-order exemplars
which later grouped to a list of features: First, the words that were
the same were grouped into characteristics, then the characteristics
that were related semantically were grouped (e.g., “ambition” and
“ambitious”), then the higher-order characteristics that were re-
lated in terms of meaning (e.g., “desire” and “yearn”) were
grouped into exemplars, and finally the exemplars that share a
common meaning (e.g., “anticipation” and “expectation”) were
grouped and formed a list of features. Following the other proto-
type studies, features were excluded when they were: (a) seman-
tically related to hope (e.g., “hope” and “to hope”5; however,
“hopeless” was grouped together with other negative emotions
such as “despair” under the more general feature “bad situations
where you are in despair”); (b) mentioned three6 times or fewer;
(c) referred to a culture-specific concept. For instance, In Dutch,
hope (“hoop”) also holds a completely different secondary mean-
ing, namely “a large amount of/a pile of.” Therefore, the features
related to this meaning were excluded. The two coders coded the
initial characteristics into two lists of features. After that, they
discussed together and combined the two lists into one; discrep-
ancies were resolved by discussion and, in the cases where this was
not sufficient, a third coder was involved. A fourth coder was
involved to solve discrepancies for the very last few cases. This
resulted in a list of 60 Dutch features.
The American MTurk participants listed in total 1,029 distinct
characteristics (M  12.02, SD  7.03, per person), mostly single
words. This dataset was coded using the same procedure as with
the Dutch dataset. This resulted in the identification of 74 English
3 We aimed at 180 participants as it is a comparable number to that in the
Dutch dataset. Considering the rate of bots on MTurk, we oversampled to
make sure we would obtain 180 usable data points. We ended up with 202
as total sample size.
4 Gender and age were not registered due to a programming error.
5 “Hopeful” and “hopefulness” were initially regarded as semantically-
related words of hope and thus were excluded from further analysis. A
helpful anonymous reviewer pointed out, however, that despite “hopeful”
being semantically similar, it has a different meaning. Indeed, as “hopeful”
is highly related to “optimistic,” it should be grouped under the feature
“positivity” instead. After checking our data again, we found that “hope-
ful” was mentioned one time in the Dutch dataset and two times in the
MTurk dataset, whereas “hopefulness” was mentioned zero times in the
Dutch dataset and four times in the MTurk dataset. After adding these
counts to the target feature “positivity,” the ranking of frequency in
Table 1 did not change.
6 Other prototype analyses removed items that were mentioned only
once or twice. This current study has a much larger sample size, and thus
items were mentioned more often. Hence, we decided to exclude items






































































































6 LUO, VAN HOREN, MILLET, AND ZEELENBERG
features. There were no discrepancies between coders, so no
additional coders were needed.
Among the two data sets, 52 features of hope were shared by
Dutch and American participants; these features are hereafter
called the features of hope. To assure that there were no differ-
ences across populations, we correlated the frequency of the 52
shared features that are mentioned in the Dutch and American data
sets. We observed a strong correlation between the frequencies of
the two data sets (r  .69, p  .001, 95% CI [0.51, 0.81]).
Subsequently, following the protocol of other prototype studies
that have different participant pools (e.g., Gregg et al., 2008;
Seuntjens et al., 2015), we kept the 52 shared features and com-
bined our Dutch and American data sets (see Table 2 for a list of
the features and exemplars).
Table 2 shows that the feature “desire” was the most frequently
mentioned feature (436 times), which is consistent with Bury,
Wenzel, and Woodyatt’s (2016, p. 588) definition of hope as
something that “emerges when a desired goal has personal signif-
icance and the realization of that goal is possible (but not neces-
sarily expected)”. However, hope is more than just desire. Other
important elements of hope are “positivity” and “future,” which
were mentioned 365 and 201 times, respectively (given 381 re-
spondents). Positivity refers to perceptions of an optimistic atti-
tude, looking at the bright side, and light at the end of the tunnel.
Future refers to the forward-looking aspect of hope. These two
features together identify the situations where hope is likely to
emerge. This is consistent with Ai, Park, Huang, Rodgers, and
Tice’s (2007) definition of hope as “a form of positive general
future expectancy.” Another important element of hope is “faith,”
which was mentioned 225 times. Although “faith” was not men-
tioned so frequently by psychologists (see the definitions in Table
1), its exemplar “belief” was at least mentioned by some. For
instance, Wenzel, Anvari, de Vel-Palumbo, and Bury (2017) re-
garded hope as “a positive anticipatory belief in the realization of
particular outcomes” (cf. Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2010). Notice-
ably, although possibility was one of the most important elements
identified by psychologists (see Table 1), it was mentioned only 71
times by participants.
Study 1 resulted in 52 cross-sample prototypical features of hope
and found a strong positive correlation between the frequency of the
features in the Dutch and American sample. This indicates a cross-
culture consistency of people’s opinions on these features. In the
subsequent studies we recruited participants from various western
countries (United Kingdom, Australia, the Netherlands), for further
generalizability of the findings. At the same time, we realize that this
is a trade-off against the coherence of the findings, and return to these
decisions in the General Discussion section.
Study 2
Study 2 assesses the centrality of the features identified in Study
1, following the standard procedure. Centrality refers to how
closely a feature is related to the concept of hope. This study was
preregistered via AsPredicted (#20112, http://aspredicted.org/blind
.php?xz7wr8t).
Method
Four-hundred and 34 Dutch undergraduate students (85 males;
Mage  20.06, SD  2.18) participated in exchange for course
credit. The sample size was determined based on the largest
sample size we had access to at that time and larger than all
published prototype analyses. Participants were asked to rate how
closely each of the 52 features derived from Study 1 was related to
hope (1  not at all related, 9  extremely related). Therefore,
they were shown each of the 52 features in random order. Each
feature was displayed with three exemplars to ensure comprehen-
sion (e.g., the feature “improvements” was followed by its exem-
plars “improvement,” “work out,” “progress”).
Results and Discussion
Mean ratings and standard deviations of the 52 hope features are
listed in the two rightmost columns of Table 2. In the original
dataset, participants’ responses were listed in rows and each fea-
ture was listed in columns. Following the standard procedure, we
first transposed the data, treating the 434 cases as variables in
columns and the 52 features as cases in rows. Subsequently, we
analyzed the reliability of the ratings of each feature among the
434 responses by using the intraclass correlation. The results
showed that the ratings of participants were highly correlated for
each of the 52 features (ICC  .99, p  .001, 95% CI [.985, .993]),
indicating participants highly agreed on the centrality ratings.
Subsequently, based on the mean ratings, we conducted a median
split and labeled the highest 26 features as central to hope and the
lowest 26 features as peripheral to hope. The difference in the
centrality between some central features and peripheral features is
small. Thus, readers should be aware that this median splitting
does not lead to a strict categorization of central versus peripheral
features. Yet, the more central a feature is, the closer and more
important it is to hope.
In accordance with the results of Study 1 and Wenzel et al.’s
(2017) definition of hope, a central aspect of hope involves faith
(exemplified by belief). Moreover, desire, positivity, and future are
also perceived as central features of hope, consistent with the
results of Study 1 and previous research (Ai, Park, Huang, Rodg-
ers, & Tice, 2007; Bury et al., 2016). Despite possibility not being
mentioned frequently in Study 1, it was rated as one of the most
central features of hope in Study 2, which is consistent with
previous research (e.g., Kavussanu et al., 2014; Nelissen, 2017;
Whitson et al., 2015). We also add to the literature some new
insights. For instance, although “uncertainty” is regarded a key-
word to define hope by some psychologists (see Table 1: e.g.,
Halevy, 2017; Leshem, Klar, & Flores, 2016), it was considered a
peripheral feature by participants. Moreover, although “belief/
faith” was rated as the most important feature of hope, it was not
used very often by previous researchers to define hope (see Table
1: e.g., Elliott, Witty, Herrick, & Hoffman, 1991; Cohen-Chen,
Crisp, & Halperin, 2015). We will further discuss the similarities
and differences between our findings and previous research in the
General Discussion section.
To summarize, we identified 52 features of hope based on
laypeople’s view of characteristics of hope (Study 1) and the
centrality ratings of the identified features (Study 2). As a result,
the list of 52 features cover most of the key components of hope
mentioned in previous literature, provides information about their
relative importance, and enriches our understanding of possible








































































































Features of Hope, Exemplars, Frequencies in Study 1, and Centrality Ratings (1  Not at All Related, 9  Extremely Related) in
Study 2, Ordered by Mean Centrality Ratings in Study 2







Faith faith belief believe 225 8.05 1.273
Positivity optimism positive bright side 365 7.62 1.386
Future future prospect look forward 201 7.62 1.376
Bad situations where you are in despaira fear tension sadness 168 7.44 1.782
Possibility chance possibility lottery 71 7.14 1.623
Goals and plans goal plan ambition 183 7.13 1.581
Motivation motivation motivated mentality 33 6.99 1.617
Peace peace war white dove 57 6.91 1.755
Desire desire want longing 436 6.89 1.786
Trust trust reliance have confidence in 85 6.84 1.681
Love love loving feeling sense of love 75 6.83 1.829
Imagination dream imagination unrealistic 163 6.82 1.76
Expectation expectation anticipation expecting 152 6.82 1.734
Feelings feelings good feelings emotion 110 6.71 1.635
Happiness happiness joy cheerful 112 6.65 1.774
Freedom freedom liberty free 37 6.64 1.86
Loved ones family friends parents 60 6.56 1.818
Religious prayer god religion 98 6.55 2.395
Determined determination perseverance holding on 109 6.5 1.894
Achievements achievements success win 52 6.48 1.809
Encourage encourage urge encouragement 12 6.44 1.737
Thoughts thoughts thinking consideration 83 6.38 1.766
Human human people humanity 26 6.36 2.028
Cope with bad situationsb cope never despair last resort 24 6.28 1.971
Improvements improvement work out progress 73 6.27 1.849
Strength strength power strong 40 6.26 2.046
Peripheral
Commitment commitment promise devotion 37 6.13 1.837
Change innovation change start 41 6.09 1.973
Good good best nice 76 6.05 1.854
Health health healthy wellness 16 6.05 1.964
Being alive breath life living 37 6.01 2.037
Excited excited enthusiasm passion 21 5.86 1.825
Effortful hard work effort striving forward 27 5.84 1.972
Outcome outcome gains reward 47 5.81 1.84
Helpful help support assistance 31 5.81 1.918
Meaningful meaningful important makes sense 18 5.79 1.987
Waiting wait waiting patience 50 5.73 2.134
Self-confidence confident pride self-confidence 45 5.68 1.982
Fairness justice fairness equality 21 5.55 1.931
Truthful truth honest sincere 14 5.5 1.961
Uncertainty uncertainty doubt unsure 67 5.47 2.225
Job and career work job career 29 5.3 2.071
Unity union solidarity collective 27 5.3 2.014
Needs necessary needs everyone needs it 16 5.23 2.017
Education education school college 20 5.14 2.247
Naïve naïve innocence child 29 4.91 2.179
Calm calm cool relief 34 4.77 2.016
Assumption assuming assumption to assume 7 4.71 1.968
Knowledge knowledge know learning 8 4.65 2.163
Active energetic active action 14 4.58 2.039
Finance stock money welfare 37 4.48 2.142
Beauty beauty handsome beautiful 18 4.04 2.005
a This feature was originally named “Bad situations where hope is needed” in Study 2, but the name of the feature was adapted thereafter for subsequent
studies to remove the influence coming from the word “hope” itself. b The key characteristic of this feature is “coping” which is quite different to the






































































































8 LUO, VAN HOREN, MILLET, AND ZEELENBERG
of the classification of features into central versus peripheral by
examining the impact of these two types of features on people’s
information processing.
Study 3
Study 3 uses a recall paradigm to test the validity of the
classification of features as central versus peripheral. Following
the logic of the other prototype analyses that central features are
more readily recoded in people’s memory than peripheral features,
we predict that recall and recognition of central features is easier
(i.e., faster) than of peripheral features. Furthermore, as a feature’s
centrality is uniformly related to its accessibility, we predict that
central features that were not asked to be memorized, resulted in a
higher rate of false recall and false recognition than peripheral
features. This study was preregistered via AsPredicted as #21146,
http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?xei22uj.
Method
Participants. We preregistered to recruit 100 Dutch students,
to have a sample size that was comparable to the other prototype
analyses (102 in Seuntjens et al., 2015; 99 in Hepper et al., 2012).
Unfortunately, only 30 Dutch undergraduate students (18 males;
Mage  19.63, SD  1.07) signed up for the study. Hence, we
recruited an additional 92 United Kingdom citizens (37 males;
Mage  36.24, SD  14.17) via Prolific, including a 20% buffer for
potential drop-outs. The Dutch students participated in exchange
for course credit and the United Kingdom citizens participated in
a series of unrelated studies in exchange for £1.20.
Materials and procedure. The 52 features identified in Study
1 and 2 were divided into two sets of 26 features, each consisting of
13 central and 13 peripheral features (randomly selected). Correlation
tests showed that the centrality ratings of the features in Set 1
(Mcentral  6.77, SD  0.49; Mperipheral  5.41, SD  0.63) did not
differ from those in Set 2 (Mcentral  6.86, SD  0.41; Mperipheral 
5.40, SD  0.51; pCentral  .66, pPeripheral  .96; see the two sets in
Appendix A). Following the standard procedure of prototype analy-
ses, we asked participants to review 26 sentences that state “Hope is
associated with: Feature,” in which the feature was highlighted (e.g.,
Hope is associated with: Uncertainty).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two sets of
features. They were told that they would view 26 statements of
hope (in a speed of 4 s per statement) and that they would be asked
to recall them later. After viewing all the statements, participants
were asked to complete an unrelated task (i.e., distraction task) for
5 min. Subsequently, they were given 3 min to recall as many
features of hope they saw in the earlier task as they could. Finally,
to assess participants’ recognition, they were presented with a full
list of the 52 features of hope and were asked to categorize them
into “features I did see before” and “features I did not see before.”
Dependent measures. Four independent variables were mea-
sured: the numbers of correct recall, false recall, correct recogni-
tion, and false recognition. For the recall task, correct recall
occurred when participants recalled a feature from the assigned set,
false recall occurred when they recalled a feature from the other
set; if participants recall a word that does not belong to any of the
two sets, it was considered neither a correct nor a false recall. For
the recognition task, correct recognition occurred when partici-
pants categorized a feature from the assigned set as “did see
before” or a feature from the other set as “did not see before”;
otherwise, it was considered a false recognition.
Results and Discussion
Two participants were excluded from the data analysis because
they failed to follow instructions (one wrote in a different language
and one wrote for all 26 recalls “Memory like a sieve”), leaving us
120 usable data points. Results are the same across sample pools.
We measured and compared four dependent variables between
central and peripheral features. The average numbers of the four
dependent variables mentioned are shown in Table 3.
To examine whether people indeed correctly and falsely recall and
recognize more central features than peripheral ones, we conducted
four Wilcoxon signed-ranks test.7 The results showed that, as ex-
pected, participants recalled significantly more central features (M 
3.67, SD  2.61) than peripheral features (M  2.84, SD  2.30;
Wilcoxon’s Z(119)  3.88, p  .001, r  .25; see Table 3), that
they falsely recalled significantly more central features (M  0.29,
SD  0.61) than peripheral features (M  0.06, SD  0.24; Wilco-
xon’s Z(119)  3.64, p  .001, r  .23), that they correctly
recognized significantly more central features (M  9.39, SD  1.90)
than peripheral features (M  8.80, SD  1.90; Wilcoxon’s
Z(119)  2.74, p  .006, r  .16), and that they falsely recog-
nized significantly more central features (M  4.83, SD  1.92) than
peripheral features (M  2.92, SD  1.71; Wilcoxon’s
Z(119)  7.49, p  .001, r  .48).
As predicted, the results of Study 3 demonstrate that the
central features of hope are indeed more accessible in memory
than the peripheral ones. Specifically, participants did not only
correctly recall and recognize more central features than pe-
ripheral ones, but are also more likely to falsely remember that
they had seen central features than peripheral features they did
not see before. Therefore, these results provide strong evidence
for our classification of central and peripheral features. An
alternative explanation emerges that, regardless of activation of
the concept of hope, the central features might in general be
more accessible in people’s memory than peripheral ones. We
explored this alternative account in Study 5.
Study 4
Study 4 further examines the validity of our classification by
examining whether it is easier for people to judge a central feature
(vs. a peripheral feature) as a feature of hope. Given the assump-
tion that central features are more accessible in people’s memory,
we hypothesize (a) that people are more likely to judge central
features (vs. peripheral ones) as a feature of hope and (b) that
people will spend less time to categorize a central feature (vs. a
peripheral one) as a feature of hope. This study was preregistered
via AsPredicted as #21447, http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x
xz7mk6.









































































































Participants and design. We preregistered to obtain at least
150 responses in the behavioral lab of the University of Melbourne
business school, resulting in a sample size comparable to other
prototype analyses. We finally ended up with a sample size as
large we had access to in the lab at that time. One-hundred and 89
Australian undergraduate students (70 males; Mage  19.19, SD 
1.23) were assigned to a three-group (feature types: central vs.
peripheral vs. control) within-subject design in exchange for
course credit.
Materials and procedure. Participants viewed 114 words: 26
central features, 26 peripheral features, and 62 unrelated neutral
words (10 were used in trial rounds before starting; the other 52
served as our control condition). The set of neutral words was
constructed by selecting 62 most frequently mentioned nouns that
did not appear in our dataset and were not related to hope8 (see the
list of neutral words in Appendix B) from a list of the 5,000 most
frequently used English words (downloaded from Word Frequency
Data, 2019). People first viewed 10 neutral words to practice the
procedure. After that, they viewed the remaining 104 words (52
remained neutral words and 52 hope feature words) one by one in
random order. Participants were asked to judge as quickly and
accurately as possible whether each of the total 104 words was a
feature of hope (“yes” or “no”). The number of yes responses and
participants response latency (in ms) were recorded.
Results and Discussion
To test our hypotheses, we first compared the percentage of
words judged as a feature of hope across three groups of stimuli.
Subsequently, because we were only interested in how fast a
feature was categorized as a hope feature, we compared the aver-
age latency of yes responses across the three conditions. We
recoded extremely slow latencies (3,000 ms) to 3,000 and ex-
tremely fast latencies (300 ms) to 300, and logarithmically
transformed the latencies to correct for skewness (cf. Greenwald,
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003, and as applied in other prototype analy-
ses). The average rates and latencies are shown in Table 4.
We compared the percentages first. A Friedman-test (basically a
nonparametric ANOVA that we use because of the skewness of the
data) found a significant main effect of feature centrality on the
rate of features classified as hope features, Friedman 2(2, 189) 
328.14, p  .001, Kendall’s W  .87. Nonparametric Wilcoxon’s
tests were conducted for simple comparisons. Central features
were more likely to be classified as a feature of hope than periph-
eral features, Z(188)  10.78, p  .001, r  .56, and that
peripheral features were more likely to be classified as a feature of
hope than the neutral words, Z(188)  11.82, p  .001,
r  .61.
We then compared the classification speed for yes responses
using the log-transformed latency. An ANOVA revealed a signif-
icant main effect of feature type on classification speed, F(1.52,
262.91)  54.26, p  .001, p2  .24. Specifically, participants
spent less time classifying central features (M  3.35, SD  0.05)
than peripheral features (M  3.36, SD  0.06), F(1, 173)9 
9.67, p  .002, p2  .05, 95% CI
10 [0.01, 0.002]. In addition,
they spent less time classifying peripheral features than neutral
words (M  3.38, SD  0.06), F(1, 173)  54.26, p  .001, p2 
.21, 95% CI [0.03, 0.02].
This study reveals that participants categorized central (as com-
pared with peripheral) features more often to hope and they spend
less time classifying central as compared to peripheral features.
Furthermore, it shows that participants categorize peripheral fea-
tures more often to hope than control features and they spent less
time categorizing peripheral than control features.
Study 5
Study 5 investigates the ecological validity of the hope proto-
type in a real-life setting by adopting a procedure that has been
previously used in a prototype analysis of greed (Seuntjens et al.,
2015). Participants were asked to recall either “a situation in which
you experience a strong feeling of hope” (hope condition) or “an
ordinary situation experienced during an ordinary week day” (con-
trol condition). They were then asked to indicate to what extent
each of the 52 features of hope appeared in the described event by
answering the question “to what extent did you feel the following
during the situation you just described” (1  not at all, 8  very
much). Each of the features were embedded in statements such as
“I had goals and plans in my mind in this situation” and “I
experienced peace in this situation.”
Assuming that central features are more accessible than periph-
eral features (as was the case in Studies 3 and 4), we predicted (a)
that hope features would be mentioned more often by people who
recalled a hope situation than for those who recalled an ordinary
event and (b) that for those who recalled a situation of hope,
central features would appear more frequently in the situation and
would thus be more representative, than peripheral features.
This study was preregistered via AsPredicted as #23240, http://
aspredicted.org/blind.php?xfy2s68.
Method
Participants and design. One-hundred and nine United King-
dom citizens (32 males; Mage  37.37, SD  13.59), recruited via
Prolific in exchange for 0.8£, were randomly allocated to a 2
(recalled situation: hope vs. control)  2 (features: central vs.
8 We made sure none of the neutral words used in this study appeared as
an exemplar in the English dataset of Study 1.
9 Because 15 people classified all 52 control features as not a feature of
hope, there are 15 missing values in their log-transformed timing for
yes-responses, resulting a 162 df’s for subsequent analyses.
10 This is the CI of the difference between the means across two groups.
The same applies to the other CIs in this study.
Table 3
Mean Number of Recalled and Recognized Central and Peripheral





measures M SD M SD Wilcoxon’s Z p
Correct recall 3.67 2.61 2.84 2.31 3.88 .001
False recall 0.29 0.61 0.06 0.24 3.64 .001
Correct recognition 9.39 1.9 8.8 1.895 2.47 .006






































































































10 LUO, VAN HOREN, MILLET, AND ZEELENBERG
peripheral) mixed design, with the first factor being the between-
subjects variable and the second the within-subject variable. We
based our sample on similar studies in published prototype anal-
yses that typically show large effect sizes (e.g., Elshout et al.,
2015; Hepper et al., 2012; Seuntjens et al., 2015).
Materials and procedure. Participants recalled and wrote
down either a situation in which they felt hope or an ordinary
situation. After describing the situation, the 52 features of hope
were in random order presented on separate screens. Participants
were asked to indicate to what extent each of the features was
present in the situation they just described (1  not at all, 8  very
much).
Results and Discussion
Before hypothesis testing, we first computed the average score of
central (M  5.03, SD  1.03) and peripheral (M  4.69, SD  1.01)
features for each response (cf. Hepper et al., 2012; Seuntjens et al.,
2015). To test the hypothesis, we conducted a 2 (recalled situation:
hope vs. control)  2 (features: central vs. peripheral) mixed mea-
sures ANOVA. The results showed only the predicted main effect of
recalled situation, F(1, 107)  25.16, p  .001, p2  .19, hope
features generally represented the hope experience better (M  5.27,
SD  0.75) than the ordinary event (M  4.41, SD  1.02). This
result confirms our first prediction that activation of hope makes
central features more accessible. To test the second prediction, simple
effect tests were conducted. The results showed that for people within
the hope condition, central features (M  5.48, SD  0.74) were more
present than peripheral features (M  5.06, SD  0.84), F(1, 107) 
36.34, p  .001, p2  .25, see Figure 2.
In addition to the preregistered analyses, we also explored
whether central features are more readily coded than peripheral
features in people’s memory regardless of the activation of hope
(something that came up in the discussion of Study 3). Whereas we
observed that for participants in the control condition (those who
recalled an ordinary event) central features were more present
(M  4.55, SD  1.08) than peripheral ones (M  4.28, SD 
Table 4
Percentages of Words Classified as Hope Features and Classification Speed in Study 4
Central Peripheral Control
Dependent measures M SD M SD M SD
Percentage categorized as hope (%) 87.45 13.20 74.44 19.52 32.14 28.41
Response speed of “yes” (ms) 2326.30 275.53 2355.90 277.50 2497.26 311.91
Response speed of “yes” (log) 3.356 0.056 3.361 0.056 3.387 0.061
Figure 2. Participants ratings of the extent to which central and peripheral features were present in the event







































































































1.03), F(1, 107)  13.75, p  .001, p2  .11, the effect size of this
difference is less than half the size of that in the hope condition.
However, as mentioned in the results earlier, the interaction in the
ANOVA was not significant, F(1, 107)  2.20, p  .14, p2  .02.
Therefore, whereas our findings are providing tentative evidence,
more research is clearly needed.
To sum up, Study 5 confirmed our preregistered hypotheses that
hope features appear more often in situations about hope than in
neutral situations and that central features appear more often than
peripheral features when describing hope events, and are thus more
representative of hope. Therefore, Studies 3–5 clearly validate the
classification of both central and peripheral features as being
indicative of hope.
General Discussion
We conducted a prototype analysis of hope to understand what
hope is, what it does, and how it is used in everyday language. We
believe that this is important, because despite hope being studied
since a long time and it considered to be a very important con-
struct, there appears to be little consensus on its definition (Bru-
ininks & Malle, 2005; McGeer, 2008). In order to address this
concern, we conducted a prototype analysis as this is a fully
data-driven bottom-up approach. As such, a definition of hope can
be identified, free from any preexisting theories or opinions. In
Studies 1 and 2, we distinguished 52 features of hope from the
responses of laypeople and assessed the centrality of each of these
features. In three subsequent studies, we established the validation
of this classification and found that central, as compared with
peripheral, features were more likely to be recalled/recognized
from memory (Study 3), more likely to be judged as features of
hope (Study 4), and appeared more frequently in situations where
people feel hope (Study 5). Together, these studies provide insight
into what hope is and what hope does.
Toward a Working Definition of Hope
Based on these findings, we propose a working definition of
hope. We compare the features identified in the prototype analysis
to those that have been identified in previous theoretical and
empirical research. Below we will make such comparisons, and
provide our understanding of the core elements of hope. We also
discuss our findings in relation to the position on hope taken by
Snyder et al. (1991) and by Averill et al. (1990). We further
address the implications of our findings, discuss the limitations,
and how they feed into potential avenues for future research.
Core features. First, “desire” (exemplars: “desire,” “want,”
“longing”) is one of the most important central features of hope, as
it is consistently identified as such in both the academic literature
(see Table 1) and in our studies. In our results, “desire” was
mentioned most frequently (436 times, almost 100 times more than
the second most mentioned feature). Participants indicated they
experience “longing” and “desiring” for things when feeling hope.
However, although “desire” is a non-negligible part of hope, it is
not hope per se. Previous research found that “desire” is elicited
when the situations are judged as “favorable for realizing the
outcome” while hope is also elicited when the situations are
difficult but the hoped-for outcome is still attainable (see the
review of Bruininks & Malle, 2005 and Roseman, Spindel, & Jose,
1990). This suggests that beyond mere desire, the possibility of
attaining the outcome constitutes another important part of hope.
That is also the second most important feature, as we discuss
below.
In addition, “possibility” (exemplars: “chance,” “possibility,”
“lottery”) is shown to be another important central feature of hope
in our prototype analyses, and this finding helps to solve an issue
in the existing literature. As is apparent in Table 1, some defini-
tions in the academic literature mention “possibility” as an impor-
tant aspect of hope (e.g., Kavussanu et al., 2014), yet some others
do not consider it at all (e.g., Elliott et al., 1991). Moreover,
although some mention “possibility” as a key element of hope, the
literature reveals different opinions as to whether “possibility”
refers to a realistic possibility (Amsler, 2008; Haase, Britt, Cow-
ard, Leidy, & Penn, 1992) or to just a wish (e.g., Leshem et al.,
2016). This shows that “possibility” is important to define hope, as
it differentiates “hope” from mere “desire,” in that people can
desire anything but will only hope for possible things. Moreover,
“possibility” differentiates “hope” from an unrealistic “wish” as
well. As such, in difficult situations, when people are in despair,
they need hope as it provides a possibility (even when unlikely) to
get out of their current situation.
Furthermore, “bad situations where you are in despair,” “coping
with bad situations,” and “positivity” are three important features
of hope. Consistent with previous research, our results identify
hope as something positive helping people to cope with negative
situations. In our results, participants associated hope with “posi-
tive thinking,” “silver lining,” “bright sight of the situation,” and
“light at end of the tunnel.” In previous research, Ai et al. (2007)
described hope as “a positive general future expectancy.” Cohen-
Chen, Crisp, and Halperin (2017) defined hope as “a positive
emotion” generated by a “desired future,” indicating hope is spe-
cifically about a positive and forward-looking outcome. Echoing
previous research, our results indeed suggest “future” (exemplars:
“future,” “prospect,” “look forward”) as a central feature of hope.
Lastly, “faith” (exemplars: “faith,” “belief,” “believe”) is shown
as a central feature of hope in our prototype analysis.11 Previous
literature, except for some (e.g., Snyder et al., 1991; Wenzel et al.,
2017), typically does not mention “faith” (or “belief”) when de-
fining hope. Our results suggest however that both faith and belief
may be more important than previously considered. Indeed, some
other researchers argue that “hope” per se is a “belief,” especially
a “belief” about “uncertain” things (Clarke, 2003; McGeer, 2008).
A working definition of hope. Taken together, on the basis of
the results of our prototype analysis, and a comparison of these
results with the academic literature, we define hope as a belief that
a positive future outcome is possible combined with a desire for
that outcome. We believe this definition has many merits: (a) it
captures the most prototypical and central features of hope based
on the rated importance (i.e., centrality) by laypeople; and (b) it
unifies the many different definitions of hope. More specifically,
our definition refers to “thoughts involving possibility,” which
implies a cognitive process and the “desire for the possibility,”
11 To clarify, although faith is, according to the dictionary definition,
associated with religions and confidence (see OED, 2019), in current
research, it was listed by participants as a separate characteristic and coded







































































































12 LUO, VAN HOREN, MILLET, AND ZEELENBERG
which implies an emotional process, indicating that hope is indeed
a mixture of both. Moreover, in line with previous research sug-
gesting that the emotion of hope could motivate people to pursue
a positive outcome (see a review of Bruininks & Howington,
2019), our findings further suggest that it might be the desire, as
the core part of the emotional dimension of hope, that induces
goal-congruent motivation and behaviors.
Unlike most of the definitions of hope in Table 1, we chose not
to explicitly define hope as a pure emotion or a pure cognition.
Hope is undoubtedly an emotion that is infused with cognition; it
cannot exist without thoughts about the current bad situation and
the desired future outcome. However, we decided not to make this
distinction explicit in our definition because our prototype analysis
did not indicate those as the most central features. Put differently,
whether hope is predominantly emotional or cognitive is not one of
the most important things people think about when they think
about hope.
Overlap and Discrepancies
In addition to providing a working definition of hope, the
current research also identifies some overlap between our findings
and some of the most important previous theories of hope, as well
as some discrepancies. In the following, we discuss (a) the simi-
larities and differences regarding the definitions of hope (we focus
on two mainstream definitions of Snyder et al., 1991 and Averill et
al., 1990, according to the review of Bruininks & Malle, 2005);
and (b) the similarities and differences regarding some important
constructs related to hope.
Snyder et al.’s (1991) definition of hope. These authors
define hope as “(a) agency (goal-directed determinations) and (b)
pathways (planning of ways to meet goals),” (p. 570), and many
other researchers followed this definition (see Table 1, e.g., Ai et
al., 2007; Curry, Snyder, Cook, Ruby, & Rehm, 1997; Davis &
Hicks, 2013; Elliott et al., 1991). This definition focuses on goal-
related features of hope and also emphasizes individuals’ ability
(Snyder et al., 1991, see Table 1). By comparing our findings with
this definition, we found the following overlap and discrepancies.
On the one hand, our findings suggest that indeed, “goals and
plans”12 and “motivation”13 are among the most important fea-
tures of hope, echoing with the “pathway” component of Snyder et
al.’s (1991) definition of hope. On the other hand, however, the
“agency” component (e.g., individual “determination” and “abil-
ity”) was not considered as one of the most important features of
hope by lay people according to our findings. Specifically, “de-
termined” was ranked only 19th among the 26 central features and
“ability” was not listed as a hope feature. Moreover, our findings
suggest features including “faith/belief,”14 “bad situations where
you are in despair,”15 “desire”16 to be important features of hope
yet were overlooked in Snyder’s definition of hope.
Averill et al.’s (1990) definition of hope. These authors’
definition of hope goes beyond the abovementioned goal-directed
framework and define hope using four “rules”: (a) hoped-for
events should be realistic/attainable; (b) they should be socially
acceptable; (c) they should be important; (d) given it is possible,
people should act on their hoped-for events. Our findings resonate
with Averill et al.’s (1990) research in several aspects, but also
differs from it in other respects, as we explain below.
The findings of our prototype analysis suggest that indeed,
“possibility” is important for people to experience hope; people’s
“motivation” and “goals and plans” are associated with hope,
indicating that they might take actions for what they hoped for.
These findings are in line with the first and fourth rule of hope
mentioned above. However, the importance of the hoped-for event
was found to be only a peripheral feature (i.e., “meaningful”) of
hope. Lastly, our findings did not indicate any thoughts of “ac-
ceptability” to be important for hope.
Further, whereas Averill et al. (1990) define hope as an emotion,
they did not describe what exact emotion composes the feelings of
hope. This might be due to the fact that they asked participants to
describe their experience of hope by distinguishing it from the
experience of desire and wanting. They thus started with the
assumption that desire is not a core element of hope, which is
contrary to our findings (see above section). More importantly, we
propose that the desire for a positive future outcome is the most
important emotional component of hope because it is one of the
core elements that came out of our prototype analysis and in line
with what was suggested by other researchers (see Table 1, e.g.,
Bury et al., 2016; Cohen-Chen et al., 2017). What’s more, the
definition of Averill et al. (1990) did not include “bad situations
where you are in despair” and “faith/belief” which are considered
important features of hope by lay people.
How hope is related to other constructs. The prototype
analysis identified a number of features that were considered as
central or peripheral. Please note that these stem from asking lay
people to list as many features as they could think of that distin-
guish hope. Experiences of hope are of course often accompanied
by other, closely related experiences, and it makes sense that these
also come to mind easily when people are requested to write down
features of hope. As a result, some central features of hope can be
seen more as concomitants of hope, than as core elements of hope
itself (cf. Seuntjens et al., 2015). Of course, the decision of which
feature is a core element and which is a concomitant, is a subjec-
tive one, and typically made top-down (thus losing some of the
advantageous of a data-driven prototype analysis). We believe that
features such as “optimism” and “love” are such concomitants. We
address below the important distinctions between optimism and
hope and between love and hope, to prevent potential confusion in
understanding hope.
Optimism (regarded as a “positive attitude” in Bennett, 2011;
Scheier & Carver, 1992) is sometimes considered the same as hope
(e.g., Maier, Peterson, & Schwartz, 2000; Peterson & Seligman,
2001). Other research distinguishes between optimism and hope by
taking the probability of an event into account: individuals are
“optimistic” about a prospect when it is highly likely to be true,
whereas they “hope” for things which are not likely but still
possible to be true (Bruininks & Malle, 2005; see empirical results
12 “Goals and plans” was rated as the sixth most important feature of
hope among the 26 central features.
13 “Motivation” was rated as the seventh most important feature of hope
among the 26 central features.
14 “Faith” exemplified by “belief” was rated as first, namely the most
important feature of hope.
15 “Bad situations where you are in despair” was rated as the fourth most
important feature of hope.







































































































in Bury, Wenzel, & Woodyatt, 2018). In other words, optimism is
about probability while hope is about possibility. Our findings add
to the distinction of the two constructs by identifying the limited
overlap between hope’s other central features and optimism. Spe-
cifically, our results show that “desire” is an important feature of
hope while it does not characterize “optimism.” “Desire” is asso-
ciated with other most important features such as “goals and plans”
and “motivation,” because “desire” as an emotion can motivate
people’s behavior (Averill et al., 1990) and it makes sense that
people work hard for what they desire for. “Optimism,” however,
is an attitude or a positive perspective of looking at life, which may
not bring the motivation and thus behavior to reach a specific
outcome. For instance, a student might work hard for GRE tests if
he or she hopes to receive a good grade but might not when feeling
optimistic that he or she will receive a good grade. As such,
whereas our findings indicate that optimism is an important feature
of hope, they also show that this positivity does not overlap much
with other important features of hope (e.g., desire, goals and plans,
motivation). Thus, we conclude that although hope has some
overlap with optimism, it should be treated as a different construct.
Love was also identified as a central feature of hope, and we
believe that love also qualifies as a concomitant instead of a core
element of hope. For love this is less complex. Love is different
from hope, as a person can feel love without feeling hope. And, the
reverse is also true, one can feel hope without feeling love (e.g.,
hope for winning a lottery ticket). Thus, although love and opti-
mism came out of the prototype analysis as being closely related to
hope, we see them as concomitants rather than as core elements of
the hope experience.
Implications
A prototype analysis identifies associations between the target
concept and other constructs. However, as we described above, a
prototype analysis cannot determine whether the associated feature
is a core element or a concomitant. The same difficulties apply
when we want to qualify the associated features as antecedents or
consequences of the studied concept. The analysis by itself cannot
do this. We can, however, propose some associations that are
worth noting for future empirical research. Again, these proposi-
tions are made top-down, based on our opinions about the current
findings and how they relate to previous theorizing. The current
findings have implications for understanding the role of hope in
everyday life. Although previous research has discussed much
about the antecedents of hope, limited research has been done to
understand what the function of hope is. The findings reveal how
hope may work as a coping mechanism. They also reveal how
hope is related to current goals and motivations, and to change for
the better.
Functions of hope. We believe that in everyday life, hope is
functional in two important and related ways. First, hope helps
people to cope with negative situations, and as such may motivate
people to keep going or undertake action. Desperate people often
need hope to continue their daily life (Cutcliffe, 1998; Cutcliffe &
Barker, 2002). Even when a positive outcome is highly unlikely,
the mere possibility of reaching such outcome should be high-
lighted in order to cope better with the situation. At least in line
with this perspective, empirical evidence from clinical research
shows that hope can help bereaved women (Holtslander &
Duggleby, 2009), substance-abuse addicts (Koehn & Cutcliffe,
2012), depressed individuals (e.g., Gordon et al., 1989), suicidal
people (e.g., Walsh & Minor-Schork, 1997), and schizophrenia
patients (e.g., Kirkpatrick et al., 1995) to improve their situation.
The central features “bad situations where you are in despair” and
“cope with bad situations” from the current prototype analysis are
clearly consistent with this coping function of hope. This coping
function has been largely studied in clinical domain, but more
research is needed to understand how this coping function of hope
influences people’s daily life.
Second, besides coping with negative situations, hope motivates
people to pursue positive outcomes in other less high-stake situa-
tions. As suggested by both our results and previous literature
(Snyder et al., 1997), hope is important in goal-oriented situations
(central feature: goals and plans). As such, in general goal-setting,
hope can motivate people to pursue their desired outcome. For
instance, if a person strongly hopes for a fitter body, one might
make strict diet plans and exercise more regularly. Indeed, previ-
ous research found that inducing hope helps consumers to con-
sume less unhealthy food (Winterich & Haws, 2011). This is
consistent with the “desire” element in hope (for a positive out-
come) that motivates people to engage in thoughts about “goals
and plans” which may eventually lead to actions. For instance,
highlighting people’s imagination of a better-self might motivate
people to take actions because it heightens their desire for it.
Antecedents of hope. Previous research suggests many ante-
cedents of hope (e.g., “pathway,” Snyder et al., 1991; perceived
human family support, education, etc., Obayuwana & Carter,
1982), so our discussion in this section will focus on other poten-
tially overlooked antecedents that were empirically important.
Other than our core elements, we do believe there are other
potential antecedents of hope that researchers can use to manipu-
late hope. For instance, a such potential antecedent of hope is
reflected in the feature “change” (exemplified by “innovation,”
“change,” and “start”). Specifically, where there are changes, there
are chances. Change brings new things, new opportunities, and
more possibilities. As a result, the new possibilities enable indi-
viduals to look into the future and motivate them to strive for the
desired positive outcome. Therefore, introducing changes or pro-
viding new opportunities to people might help them to restore their
desire for reaching the possible positive future. This resonates with
Averill et al.’s (1990) finding that hope can be initiated by changes
in hoped-for events. At least some empirical research successfully
induced hope by manipulating perceptions of a “changing world”
(Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014).
Limitations and Future Research
We think that this set of studies provides compelling insights
into what people talk about when they talk about hope. We are
however aware of the limitations of these studies and how these
create room for further research. One of the limitations is the
usage of different samples across studies. We think that because
we focused on the more basic elements of emotion, and because
we recruited participants from several western countries, these
differences seem limited. One may argue, however, that it would
have been better to sample participants from the same population
throughout the whole analysis, because the findings would have
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results in other populations. At the same time, we also think that
having participants from the U.S., the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and Australia is a strong point of our research. Given the
correspondence of the findings in Study 1, and the replication of
the distinction between central and peripheral features in Studies
2–5, having different populations adds to the generalizability of
our findings. As such, our findings speak toward our generic
characterization of hope. Future research may investigate potential
differences in centrality of features between different and more
diverse cultures and finetune the definition of hope for these
specific cultures.
A second limitation of the current analysis is that we were not
able to rule out that the features that we found to be central to hope
are generally more accessible than the peripheral features. This
general difference in accessibility was an alternative explanation
for the findings reported in Study 3 (that is, also when hope is not
involved). Our findings in Study 5 clearly show that central fea-
tures are more often mentioned than peripheral ones when people
think about situations in which they experienced hope and that this
difference is attenuated when thinking about in ordinary situations.
Our exploratory analyses could not, however, rule out that central
features are always more accessible and experienced than periph-
eral features. We suggest that our study could not provide conclu-
sive evidence as it seems that hope is omnipresent in people’s daily
life and routines (e.g., we hope that the weather will be sunny
tomorrow, not to get in a terrible traffic jam, etc.).
In summary, in this research, we adopted a completely
bottom-up approach, and used laypeople’s conceptualizations to
derive a prototype of hope. The result of this analysis is the
identification of a set of features that are central to the concept of
hope and that may be instrumental in explaining when and why
people feel hope. This provides insights into how feelings of hope
impact people’s goal striving and how hope helps to cope with
uncertainty. The prototype analysis revealed that hope is a belief
that a positive future outcome is possible combined with a desire
for that outcome. We believe that our research provides a more
nuanced understanding of hope and its associations with other
constructs, and we hope that the current findings will contribute to
future research on this important and intriguing topic.
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Appendix A
The Two Random Sets Used in Study 3
No. Set 1 Set 2
Central features
1 thoughts Imagination
2 bad situations where you are in despair motivation






9 freedom cope with bad situations
10 faith feelings

























































































































The 62 Neutral Words Used in Study 4
The 10 trial words
Sand Lady Colleague Application
Neck Damage Plastic Plate
Writing Start
The 52 neutral words used in control condition
State Position Art Cup
Hand Player Teacher Region
Part Form Rate Television
Place Author Voice Box
Case Color Season Card
Week Page Paper Seat
Point Article Site Passenger
Room Minute Table Mark
Area Body Phone Chip
Eye Face Computer Bike
Word Number Hair Tea
Foot Name Window Lake
Field Town List Sand
Received November 7, 2019
Revision received March 30, 2020






































































































18 LUO, VAN HOREN, MILLET, AND ZEELENBERG
